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Abstract: In a new paper, David. J. Chalmers examines eleven possible solutions to the meta-
problem of consciousness, ‘the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of 
consciousness.’ The present paper argues that Chalmers overlooks an explanation that he has 
otherwise taken seriously, and which a number of philosophers, physicists, and computer 
scientists have taken seriously as well: the hypothesis that we are living in a computer simulation. 
This paper argues that a particular version of the simulation hypothesis is at least as good of a 
solution to the meta-problem of consciousness as many explanations Chalmers considers, and 
may even be a better one—as it may be the best solution to a much broader meta-philosophical 
problem: the meta-problem of everything, the problem of explaining why our world has the 
quantum-mechanical, relativistic, and philosophical features it does. 
 
In a new paper, David. J. Chalmers examines the meta-problem of consciousness, ‘the problem 
of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness.’1 According to Chalmers, 
this is an empirical problem—one concerning the mechanisms that lead people to believe 
and report that there is a hard problem of consciousness.2 Chalmers then examines eleven 
possible explanations of the meta-problem, that is, eleven empirical hypotheses about why 
people believe and say that there is a hard problem of consciousness. The present paper 
argues that Chalmers overlooks a solution to the meta-problem which he has otherwise 
taken seriously3, and which a number of philosophers4, physicists5, computer scientists6, and 
programmers7 have taken seriously as well: the theory that we live in a computer simulation. 
It is not altogether surprising that Chalmers ignores this hypothesis in discussing the meta-
problem of consciousness—as the simulation hypothesis has been argued by some to lack 
                                                          
1 Chamers (2018a): 6. 
2 Ibid: 10. 
3 Chalmers (2015, 2017, 2018b). 
4 Bostrom (2003), Arvan (2013, 2014, 2015), Johnson (2011), Mizrahi (2017). 
5 Beane et al (2012) and Campbell et al. (2017). 
6 Moravec (1998), and Whitworth (unpublished manuscript). 
7 Grange (2016). 
2 
 
any evidential support.8 However, this paper argues to the contrary that a particular version 
of the simulation hypothesis has at least as much evidential support as many of the 
hypotheses Chalmers considers, while also possessing far greater explanatory power—as 
the simulation hypothesis in question may be best solution to a much broader 
metaphilosophical problem: the ‘meta-problem of everything.’ 
§1. The Case for the P2P Simulation Hypothesis 
Our world has a wide variety of deeply perplexing physical and philosophical features. 
Consider physics. At present, our two best theories of fundamental physics are the General 
Theory of Relativity, which explains gravitation, and Quantum Mechanics, which explains all 
other known forces. Both theories have been systematically confirmed by experiment—yet 
both theories tell us our world’s physics is incredibly strange. General Relativity tells us that: 
i. Space and time are relative to observers: simultaneous events in one reference 
frame are non-simultaneous from another, time moves at different rates depending 
on the observer’s frame of reference, and the physical properties of objects in space-
time (e.g. their length) depends on the observer’s reference-frame. 
ii. The physical world has a ‘speed-limit’: no information can travel faster than light.  
Quantum mechanics, in turn, tells us that all of the following are true of our world: 
iii. Quantum superposition: every particle simultaneously exists in many different 
eigenstates (i.e. a superposition of different space-time locations and properties). 
iv. Quantum indeterminacy: the eigenvalue a particle will be observed to have upon 
measurement is indeterminate, in that the value can in principle only be predicted 
probabilistically. 
                                                          
8 Huemer (2016). 
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v. Wave-particle duality: every individual particle simultaneously has properties of 
particle (existing at a particular point) and a wave (spread out over space and time).  
vi. Wave-function collapse: observation of a particle (or measurement of quantum 
system it is a part of) leads the wave-like features of a particle (viz. the particle’s 
superposition) to ‘collapse’ to a single observed value (i.e. the observed properties of 
the particle). 
vii. Quantum entanglement: particles arbitrary distances apart can become entangled, 
such that changing the physical properties of one particle will instantaneously change 
the other particle’s properties without any observable exchange of information. 
viii. Minimum space-time distance: there is a minimum space-time distance below 
which space and time themselves have no physical meaning (the Planck Length).9 
ix. Quantum retrocausality: measurements of a quantum system can have observable 
effects on the system earlier in time, causing wave-function collapse before the 
measurement is taken.10 
These features of our world are incredibly bizarre—yet they are implied by the equations of 
quantum mechanics, and quantum mechanics been systematically confirmed by experiment. 
 Finally, our world has a number of puzzling metaphysical features—among them (to 
simplify a great deal): 
x. The mind-body problem (hard problem of consciousness): it appears impossible to 
reduce or identify phenomenal consciousness to anything physical.11 
                                                          
9 Padmanabhan (1985). 
10 Leifer & Pusey (2017). 
11 See e.g. Chalmers (2016). 
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xi. The problem of causation: events in our world are ‘constantly connected’ (viz. causal 
regularities), yet empirical observation appears insufficient to explain why events are 
constantly connected, or whether there is a primitive metaphysical ‘causal force’ that 
connects them.12  
xii. The problem of time and time’s passage: although some arguments in physics and 
philosophy suggest that all times (past, present, and future) exist eternally, time 
seems to pass.13 
xiii. The problem of personal identity: although we experience ourselves as though we 
persist as identical persons across time, it appears impossible to explain personal 
identity in physical or psychological terms.14 
xiv. The problem of free will: philosophical considerations and the laws of physics 
suggest that our choices must be determined—which some philosophers think entails 
we have no free will. Yet it seems, for all that, like we have free will.15 
All of these puzzling features of our world—the puzzling features of physics, and the 
philosophical problems just presented—are typically grappled with independently: with the 
physicists doing physics, and philosophers doing the philosophy. Both groups, however, 
have run up against apparently insuperable obstacles. On the one hand, physicists have been 
unable to explain why our world has relativistic and quantum-mechanical features. Physics 
merely studies how the world actually behaves, basing its equations and explanations on 
observation. However, that is all physics can do: explain what we observe and how what we 
                                                          
12 See Schaffer (2016) for an overview. 
13 Markosian (2016), Le Poidevin (2015). 
14 Ninan (2009). 
15 O’Connor & Franklin (2018). 
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observe ‘works' (viz. the equations of relativity and quantum theory). What physics cannot 
do is explain why our world has the observable features in the first place. Why, of all of the 
metaphysically possible universes that could have existed, do we exist in world with 
relativistic and quantum mechanical physics? This does not appear to be a question of 
physics, but rather of metaphysics. Alas, metaphysics arguably faces insuperable problems of 
its own. Metaphysical debates on most major issues—ranging from mind-body problem to 
problems of time, personal identity, free will, and so on—typically result in interminable 
stalemates: with different groups of philosophers defending different, fundamentally 
opposed metaphysical theories, with no clear way to resolve which theory is true.16 For 
example, in the mind-body problem literature alone, there are serious proponents of 
eliminative materialism, mind-brain identity-theory, non-reductive physicalism, 
functionalism, panpsychism, property dualism, and substance dualism.17 Similar stalemates 
exist across metaphysics, and in philosophy in general—leading some to wonder whether 
philosophy makes real progress.18 Another way of putting this is that physics and philosophy 
together face what we might call the meta-problem of everything: the question of 
explaining why our world spears to us to have the many puzzling physical and metaphysical 
features it does, including the meta-problem of consciousness. Might there be a single, 
unified solution to this broader meta-problem that in turn solves the meta-problem of 
consciousness? Indeed, there may be. 
                                                          
16 See Willard (2013). 
17 Bogardus (2013). 
18 Dietrich (2011), Slezak (2018). 
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Consider the hypothesis that we are living in a computer simulation. Do we have any 
evidence for the simulation hypothesis beyond Bostrom’s probabilistic speculation19? In a 
recent article, Arvan notes that although each of the following theories is controversial, 
philosophers and physicists have argued there is some evidence for each of them20: 
A. Eternalism: past, present, and future objects and properties all exist “timelessly.” 
B. The Multiverse Hypothesis: the observable universe is a small part of a vast 
‘multiverse.’ 
C. The Holographic Principle: to unify quantum mechanics and general relativity, the 
universe must be understood as digital information written on the cosmological 
horizon. 
D. Mind-body Dualism: the mind is in some sense non-physical. 
E. Subjectivity About the Flow of Time: time’s passage is not in the objective physical 
world but rather within us (i.e. within consciousness). 
F. The Further Fact Theory of Personal Identity: personal identity is a brute, simple 
fact that cannot be reduced to any physical or psychological phenomena. 
G. Single Commonly-Experienced (or“Actualized”) Timeline: only one physical 
universe—our Universe—is experienced by conscious observers. 
Arvan argues that if all of these theories are jointly true, then our ‘physical world’ is a 
hologram generated by each individual’s consciousness ‘reading’ digital information on the 
cosmological horizon, projecting that digital information as a four-dimension ‘world’ of 
                                                          
19 Bostrom (2003). 
20 Arvan (2013): Section I. 
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objects in space-time, such that the joint projections of each person’s consciousness 
constitute an intersubjective reality that we all experience together.21 
 In the same article and in several follow-up pieces, Arvan argues that this 
metaphysical model of reality is functionally identical to a certain kind of computer 
simulation: a peer-to-peer networked (P2P) simulation.22 First, Arvan notes that online 
videogames just are physical mechanisms (computer processor) reading digital information 
(e.g. on a DVD), projecting that information as a four-dimensional world for different ‘users’ 
to navigate—which is what hypotheses (A)-(G) jointly entail our world is. Second, Arvan 
argues that a particular kind of simulation—peer-to-peer networked (P2P) 
simulations—actually replicate our world’s relativistic and quantum-mechanical physical 
features due to the computational structure of peer-to-peer networking itself.23 For consider 
what a P2P simulation is. In contrast to dedicated server simulations—where there is a 
central computer representing the spatio-temporal locations of all objects in the 
simulation—a P2P simulation has no central computer at all: instead, a P2P simulation is 
simply a network of independent simulations interacting with each other (see Figure 1). In 
a P2P simulation, each ‘user’ only ever experiences their simulation, and ‘the physical world’ 
that all users experience in common is just a superposition of all of the simulations interacting 
on the network.  
 
  
                                                          
21 Ibid: Section II. 
22 Ibid: footnotes 60-61; Arvan (2014, 2015). 
23 Arvan (2014, 2015). 
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Figure 1. Two Types of Simulations 
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Next, Arvan shows24 that because there is no central server representing where objects 
‘really are’ in a P2P simulation, P2P simulations computationally replicate every basic 
feature of quantum mechanics: 
                                                          
24 Arvan (2014, 2015). 
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 Replicating quantum superposition: A P2P simulation just is a superposition of 
multiple simulated environments interacting in parallel. 
 Replicating quantum indeterminacy: ‘The’ location of any object or property in a 
P2P simulation is therefore indeterminate, given that each computer on the network 
has its own representation of where ‘the’ object or property is, with no dedicated 
server on the network to represent where the object or property ‘really’ is. 
 Replicating wave-particle duality: Because different simulations in a P2P network 
represent the same objects in slightly different positions at any given instant, a 
dynamical description of where a given object/property probably is in ‘the 
environment’ will have features of a wave (viz. an amplitude equivalent to the number 
of computers representing the object at a given point, and wavelength equivalent to 
dynamical change of how many computers represent the object at a given point at the 
next instant). At the same time, because each individual simulation always has its own 
representation of where objects are in the environment, any measurement taken by 
any simulation in the network will always represent fundamental objects as existing 
at a particular point (qua particle). 
 Replicating wave-function collapse: Because a P2P simulation is superposition of 
parallel interacting simulations, but any measurement by a user in any one simulation 
will represent that object at a determinate location within their individual simulation, 
any measurement taken in a P2P simulation will appear to any observer to ‘collapse’ 
the superposition/wave-like properties of any object to a point. 
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 Replicating quantum entanglement: If a P2P simulation does not have perfect 
error-correction, then multiple computers on a network can represent one particle as 
existing in two places, representing them as one entangled particle. 
 Replicating minimum space-time distance: Because a simulated reality is 
comprised by digital rather than continuous information, that reality must be 
‘pixelated’ at a fundamental level—that is, its smallest objects and properties must be 
separated by some minimum distance ('between the digital information’) that has no 
informational content in the simulation. 
 Replicating quantum retrocausality: in P2P simulations, spatiotemporal conflicts 
between different simulations on the network may be resolved by error-correction 
algorithms that ‘alter the past.’25 
The P2P simulation not only replicates quantum features—it replicates relativistic ones: 
 Replicating spatio-temporal relativity: P2P simulations have no ‘master clock’ or 
objective representation where things are in their simulated space-time: all 
observations are relative to individual users on each individual simulation. Further, 
Grange argues that processing limitations in a P2P system should have relativistic 
effects on observed time and space.26 
 Replicating maximum speed-limit: Grange argues that in a P2P simulation, 
bandwidth limitations constraining communication-speed between different 
                                                          
25 Here is one actual example: in the videogame Halo 3, if I kill your character slightly before you kill me on 
my simulation, but the opposite occurs on your simulation (i.e. you kill me slightly before I kill you), the 
network retroactively resolves the temporal conflict by killing both characters ‘simultaneously’ (something 
which notoriously frustrated many gamers). 
26 Grange (2016). 
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simulations on the network entail a maximum speed limit of information travel within 
each simulation.27  
Finally, Arvan shows that P2P simulations replicate a variety of metaphysical problems: 
 Replicating the mind-body problem: Because each individual’s ‘subjective point of 
view’ is constituted by a processor that underlies and generates their ‘physical’ reality 
as a projection, each individual in a P2P simulation would have the sense that their 
‘mind’ cannot be reduced to anything physical-functional in their world…and they 
would be right (the processor they are is not in the simulation at all: it grounds the 
simulation as the projecting mechanism that represents ‘their world’ as a hologram). 
 Replicating the problem of causation: because each individual in a P2P system 
would experience their reality as a connected series of events, each individual would 
have the sense that there must be something to causation beyond the series events 
itself—some ‘force’ that explains why those events are connected…and they would 
be right (their processor connects the events). 
 Replicating the problem of time, time’s passage, and subjectivity of time’s flow: 
Because a P2P simulation consists of digital information ‘being read’ by a processing 
mechanism, individuals living in a P2P simulation would believe there is a sense in 
which past, present, and future exist ‘timelessly’, while also believing time passes 
subjectively…and they would be right (as time’s passage would consist in their 
processor processing ‘timeless’ digital information, projecting a ‘moving present’). 
 Replicating problems of personal identity and free will: Individuals living in a P2P 
simulation would be inclined to believe that there is something more to their personal 
                                                          
27 Ibid. 
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identity and free will beyond their ‘physical world’…and they would be right (their 
identity over time would be comprised by the processor that grounds their projected 
point-of-view, and their ‘choices’ in the simulation would actually be made in a higher-
reference frame (the level of the ‘user’ or processor’), giving rise to apparent causal-
closure in the simulation (and hence, the worry that they are not free).28 
The P2P Simulation Hypothesis is, to my knowledge, the only unified explanation currently 
on offer of all of the above physical and meta-physical features of our world: that is, it is the 
only unified explanation we have of the meta-problem of everything—of which the meta-
problem of consciousness is a special case. 
2. Comparison to Alterative Solutions to the Meta-Problem of Consciousness 
Chalmers considers the following eleven explanations of the hard problem of consciousness 
(each of which thus constitutes a ‘solution’ to the meta-problem of consciousness): 
1. Introspective models: by modeling its own internal states, the brain represents its own 
states in a way that gives rise to the hard-problem of consciousness.29 
2. Phenomenal concepts: the hard-problem results from special concepts presenting our 
conscious states to us as otherwise than physical.30 
3. Independent roles: the hard-problem results from phenomenal and physical concepts 
lacking strong inferential connections to one another.31 
                                                          
28 As a simple example, consider the videogame PacMan. From within PacMan’s simulated world, just about 
everything appears ‘deterministic’. Even PacMan’s behavior—the character you control as a user—can be 
predicted probabilistically, given your tendencies as a player. However, PacMan’s behavior (unbenknownst to 
anyone ‘living in’ that reality) is actually controlled by you as the outside user. PacMan’s behavior in the 
simulation, then, is not actually determined by the ‘physical laws’ of the simulation (including whatever 
probabilistic equations explain how he behaves). His behavior just appears to be determined because no one 
in the simulation has any observational access to the inputs to the system you are making as its outside ‘user.’ 
29 Chalmers (2018a): 12-3. 
30 Ibid: 13-4. 
31 Ibid: 14. 
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4. Introspective opacity: the hard-problem results from brain-processes representing 
other brain-processes as though they are not brain processes.32 
5. Direct access: the hard-problem results from introspective states being direct and 
non-inferential, representing things like ‘greenness’ as primitive properties.33  
6. Primitive quality attribution: the hard-problem results from our perceptual capacities 
attributing primitive qualities (e.g. colors) to things.34 
7. Primitive relation attribution: the hard-problem results from introspective models 
introducing primitive relations of seeing, hearing, etc., to simplify highly complex 
relations (such as color-wavelengths) in a cognitively efficient way.35 
8. Introjection and the phenomenological fallacy: the hard-problem results from 
fallaciously inferring from phenomenal experiences (e.g. consciousness experience of 
redness) that the object of the experience (phenomenal redness) exists.36 
9. The user illusion: the hard-problem is the result of consciousness itself being an 
illusion generated by the brain, much like folders on computer desktop are illusions 
regarding the computational reality that underlies them.37 
10. The use-mention fallacy: the hard-problem results from the way we think about 
consciousness being different than the way we think about brain states.38 
                                                          
32 Ibid: 14-5. 
33 Ibid: 15-6. 
34 Ibid: 16-8. 
35 Ibid: 18-20. 
36 Ibid: 20-1. 
37 Ibid: 21. 
38 Ibid: 21-2 
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11. Historical explanations: the hard-problem can be explained away in either 
evolutionary terms39, re-entrant feedback loops in a higher-dimensional space40, 
conflicts in judgments about consciousness from dual-process cognitive systems41, 
the necessity of cognitive system to avoid a regress in positing subject-object 
distinctions42, and so on.43 
How should we evaluate each of these explanations against each other, and against the P2P 
Simulation Hypothesis? Although there are complex issues in the philosophy of science here, 
two criteria immediately present themselves: empirical adequacy (support from empirical 
evidence) and explanatory power. For example, whereas Ptolemaic astronomy falsely 
predicted planetary orbits, and could not explain observations of retrograde motion, 
Copernican astronomy explained and predicted retrograde motion. Finally, empirical 
adequacy can be broken down into roughly two issues: how much positive empirical support 
a hypothesis has (viz. confirmation), and the extent to which the hypothesis conflicts with 
observations (viz. disconfirmation).  
Let us consider then, first, how much positive empirical support Chalmers’ eleven 
hypotheses have. To the best of my knowledge, all eleven hypotheses are based primarily on 
philosophical conjecture: I do not know of a single empirical study that suggests the existence 
of phenomenal concepts, introspective opacity, and so on. Because the P2P Hypothesis is 
largely based on conjecture as well (viz. seven philosophical and physical hypotheses 
philosophers and physicists have argued there is some evidence for), the P2P Hypothesis 
                                                          
39 Humphrey (2014),  
40 Ibid. 
41 Fiala et al (2011). 
42 Molyneux (2012). 
43 Chalmers (forthcoming): 22-3. 
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appears to have roughly the same level of positive empirical support as many of the eleven 
hypotheses Chalmers considers.  
Now consider disconfirmation: the question how much different hypotheses conflict 
with our observed evidence. The most obvious concern to have here about the P2P 
Hypothesis is that, insofar as it explains the problem of consciousness in functionalist terms 
(viz. simulated reality), it cannot explain phenomenal properties themselves (i.e. ‘what it is 
like’ to phenomenally experience the color red). However, as Chalmers argues, this appears 
to be a problem with many of the hypotheses he considers.44 Thus, the P2P Hypothesis fares 
no worse than many of the hypotheses that Chalmers considers as serious explanations of 
the meta-problem of consciousness.  
Finally, what about explanatory power? Here, the P2P Hypothesis is a clear winner. 
For whereas the eleven hypotheses Chalmers considers would at best explain why we think 
there is a problem of consciousness, the P2P Hypotheses may provide the first unified 
explanation of a much wider variety of physical and philosophical problems—not just the 
meta-problem of consciousness, but also the meta-problem of everything.  
In sum, taking into account empirical adequacy and explanatory power together, the 
P2P Hypothesis is at least as good of a solution to the meta-problem of consciousness as 
many of the hypotheses Chalmers considers—and it may well be the best explanation of all. 
 
  
                                                          
44 See e.g. ibid: 21, 22, 25-7, 30-3. 
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